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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Stated preference values elicited from contingent valuation methods are often viewed with 
skepticism because these values are derived from hypothetical—rather than actual— transactions 
(e.g., Hausman 2012). Empirical evidence developed over the past 40 years comparing 
hypothetical and actual valuations for the same good (public or private) has largely contributed to 
this skepticism. While exceptions exist, most experimental studies have found systematic 
disparities between valuations elicited from hypothetical transactions with those obtained in an 
actual marketplace. This disparity, known as hypothetical bias, has been well documented for both 
laboratory and field experiments (List and Gallet 2001; Murphy et al. 2005; Penn and Hu 2018) 
and has spurred an interest in explaining and finding approaches to eliminate the problem. 
 Another issue in the use of contingent valuation methods is the choice between eliciting 
estimates of Willingness to Accept (WTA) compensation for foregoing rights to resources, or 
eliciting Willingness to Pay (WTP) to access resources. A voluminous literature has shown that 
the choice matters since WTA and WTP have consistently been found to be empirically different. 
Meta-analyses of this evidence has revealed that WTA values are often much larger than WTP 
values and that the causes of the disparity are not limited to issues with survey techniques alone 
(Horowitz and McConnell 2002; Tuncel and Hammitt 2014). A number of alternative explanations 
for the disparity have been suggested.  Two are consistent with standard economic theory: income 
effects and substitution. Income effects are possible because WTP is strictly limited by budget 
constraints while WTA is not. If the income elasticity of demand is large enough that income 
significantly constrains ability to pay, WTA may exceed WTP (Randall and Stoll 1980). The 
difference between WTA and WTP has also been shown to be related to the absence of substitutes 
(Hanemann 1991). That is, holding income effects constant, the fewer substitutes available the 
greater the potential ratio of WTA/WTP because it becomes more difficult to maintain an 
individual at a constant level of utility through compensation. In the case of zero substitutability it 
would be impossible to compensate an individual to forgo a resource or give up a good, thereby 
leading to extreme WTA values. A third explanation offered for the WTA-WTP disparity, outside 
the framework of conventional economic theory, emphasizes the psychological importance of 
reference points suggested by Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Prospect Theory 
posits that people define gains and loses based on a reference point, typically the status quo, and 
losses from this reference point are valued higher than corresponding gains. Thaler (1980) was the 
first to apply Prospect Theory to the disparity between WTA and WTP and introduced the term 
Endowment Effect to explain the phenomenon. Individuals asked for their WTA for a good will 
consider the good part of their endowment while individuals asked for their WTP will not. These 
conditions can result in WTA compensation values that are higher than WTP values for the same 
good.   
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In our study we focus on eliciting WTA values for use in recreational fisheries damage 
assessments (e.g., to establish levels of compensation for recreational fishermen after a chemical 
spill) and for benefit-cost analyses of restrictive fisheries policies (e.g., regulations that curtail 
access). In both cases, angler welfare would be expected to decline so WTA measures are more 
appropriate because WTA provides a selling price, relevant for valuing a proposed loss, whereas 
WTP provides a purchase price, relevant for valuing a proposed gain (Bromley 1995; Brown and 
Gregory 1999; Knetsch 2010; Whittington, Adamowicz, and Lloyd-Smith 2017). Perceived or 
actual property rights are also theorized to be a necessary criterion for employing a WTA format. 
If respondents do not perceive any rights over the resources or good being valued then a WTA 
elicitation format could lead to biased results (Freeman 2003). The respondents in our study 
purchased a quasi-public good – a saltwater recreational fishing license issued by the state of 
Massachusetts (MA) for the right to access a public resource.1 While a fishing license does not 
infer exclusive property rights to public resources, it clearly assigns de jure access rights to the 
resources. 
 
1.1 Actual Versus Hypothetical WTA 
The first objective of our research was to compare hypothetical WTA values for MA saltwater 
recreational fishing licenses with WTA values obtained in an actual (simulated) marketplace. An 
actual market for fishing licenses was simulated by offering anglers real cash in return for giving 
up their 2012 fishing license. A separate treatment group of anglers was offered hypothetical cash 
to relinquish their license. Using the actual treatment group as a benchmark for assessing 
hypothetical bias, parametric and non-parametric evaluations revealed that hypothetical WTA 
responses overstated values based on actual transactions. These findings generally align with the 
fairly limited and dated number of WTA studies comparing hypothetical to actual valuations. A 
literature search revealed only eight studies that elicited both hypothetical and actual WTA values, 
and all were published prior to 2004 (Table 1). While the majority of the nine WTA observations 
reported in these studies pointed to an overestimation problem, the evidence was not entirely 
unanimous, as mean ratios of hypothetical WTA to actual WTA ranged from 0.70 to 28.20. Bishop 
and Heberlein’s (1990) sealed-bid auction experiment of deer hunters has been the only study to 
report a mean hypothetical/actual ratio less than one (0.70). In contrast, List and Shogren’s (2002) 
random price auction experiment of WTA to surrender holiday gifts yielded a mean ratio of 
hypothetical to actual WTA of 1.05, but this difference was statistically indistinguishable. Smith 
and Mansfield (1998) came to the same conclusion in their dichotomous choice experiment which 
revealed no significant differences between real and hypothetical WTA statements for the 
opportunity to spend time in a second set of interviews on an undisclosed topic. The mean 
 
1 Quasi-public goods are those provided by the government, typically for a nominal fee that is not determined by 
market forces (see Chambers, Chambers, and Whitehead 1998, Carson and Groves 2007). Common examples include 
recreational fishing and hunting licenses, public parks, historic buildings, and campgrounds located near public lakes.  
Quasi-public goods have both private and public attributes because it is possible to exclude members of the public by 
charging a price to access or use the good. 
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hypothetical/actual ratios for the remaining six WTA observations though were all significantly 
greater than one. These studies evaluated real and hypothetical WTA statements for goose hunting 
permits (Bishop and Heberlein 1979), to experience a drop of the bitter-tasting sucrose octa-acetate 
(Coursey, Hovis, and Schulze 1987), alternative densities of trees in a new, public park 
(Brookshire and Coursey 1987), deer hunting permits (Bishop and Heberlein 1990), and holiday 
gift giving (List and Shogren 1998). Nape et al. 2003 also compared actual and hypothetical WTA 
responses for a private good (a Far Side cartoon wall calendar). While the authors do not report 
mean WTA valuations, their evidence aligns with ours and supports the existence of overstated 
WTA hypothetical bias. 
Table 1. WTA Studies 
 
Study Year Type of good Ratio of mean hypothetical 
WTA to mean actual WTA 
Bishop and Heberlein 1979 Quasi-public 1.60 
Coursey, Hovis, and Schulze 1987 Private 2.00 
Brookshire and Courseya 1987 Public 25.79 
   28.20 
Bishop and Heberlein 1990 Quasi-public 0.70 
   2.74 
Smith and Mansfield 1998 Private 1.07 
List and Shogren 1998 Private 1.42 
List and Shogren 2002 Private 1.05 
Nape et al. 2003 Private N/A 
a The authors report more than one value. 
 
1.2 Accounting for Uncertainty to Mitigate Hypothetical Bias 
Despite WTA often being the more appropriate measure to assess welfare losses, hypothetical 
WTA studies have comparatively seldom been performed because of a longstanding view that they 
result in a greater degree of bias than equivalent hypothetical WTP formats (Mitchell and Carson 
1989; Arrow et al. 1993; OMB 2003). The reality though is that studies using the WTP format 
have generally suffered from a substantial overestimation bias as well. Meta-analyses show that 
the statistical evidence does not support the argument that WTP studies are less prone to 
hypothetical bias than WTA studies (e.g., Little, Broadbent, and Berrens 2012; Penn and Hu 2018). 
In the more recent literature, the reluctance to pose hypothetical WTA questions to respondents 
when assessing welfare losses is diminishing as researchers have increasingly recognized that 
substituting a WTP value for a desired WTA value will tend to undervalue environmental assets 
(e.g., Bush et al. 2013; Kaczan, Swallow, and Adamowicz 2013). To the extent that WTA measures 
of value will provide a more accurate reflection of welfare losses in many cases, an issue to be 
resolved is how to correct for overstated WTA hypothetical bias. Towards this end, the second 
objective of our study was to evaluate the effectiveness of applying an ex-post certainty adjustment 
technique for removing overstated hypothetical WTA bias. The certainty adjustment approach is 
based on a follow-up certainty question with two degrees of certainty and has been applied in a 
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number of dichotomous choice WTP settings. We apply the approach for the first time to 
hypothetical WTA responses. 
The certainty adjustment technique was originally developed based on the hypothesis that 
overstated hypothetical WTP bias might arise, in part, from respondents’ uncertainty about 
whether they would actually pay under a real rather than a dichotomous choice hypothetical WTP 
setting (Blumenschein et al. 1998). Proponents of this approach suggest that overstated 
hypothetical WTP bias can be reduced or eliminated by recoding a yes response to no if the 
respondent expresses a high degree of uncertainty in a follow-up certainty question. Applying this 
practical approach to our study was particularly appealing because respondents were asked about 
a good that they had likely never thought of in monetary terms.   
Two ex-post certainty adjustment techniques have primarily been used in the WTP literature 
and each has its own advantages. The first collects information about the degree of certainty of the 
hypothetical yes responses on a 10-point rating scale, usually between 1 and 10, with 1 labelled 
“very uncertain” or “very unsure” and 10 labelled “very certain” or “very sure.” The advantage of 
the 10-point certainty scale is that it provides a flexible approach for respondents that state they 
would pay the hypothetical amount to indicate how sure they are that they would actually pay. Yes 
respondents whose level of certainty falls below some specified threshold are then recoded to no. 
It is presumed that respondents who indicate yes but are fairly uncertain would likely reject the 
WTP question if it was real. Studies using this approach have generally found that the recoded 
hypothetical responses correspond to actual payments. The disadvantage of the approach is 
determining the appropriate certainty cutoff point for recoding a yes response to no. Champ et al. 
(1997) who evaluated real and hypothetical donations for road removal in Grand Canyon National 
Park, and Blumenschein et al. (2001) who compared real and hypothetical purchase decisions for 
a pharmacist provided asthma management program, found that it was necessary to recode all 
certainty values below 10 to no before mean hypothetical WTP was equivalent to actual WTP. In 
contrast, in a study of donations for wind power in Wisconsin (Champ and Bishop 2001) and in a 
public goods study by Norwood (2005), a cut-off of 8 was required to equalize hypothetical and 
actual WTP. While Ethier et al. (2000) and Poe et al. (2002) who both evaluated stated preference 
responses for green-pricing electricity programs, and Morrison and Brown (2009) in a study of 
donations to a Red Cross children’s breakfast fund, found that a cut-off of 7 produced hypothetical 
and actual WTP values that were statistically similar. Champ, Moore, and Bishop (2009) suggest 
that the (sample) mean level of certainty may be an appropriate cutoff point, but it is apparent that 
more progress in this area of research is needed. 
The second ex-post adjustment approach is more appealing because it avoids the need for 
determining the appropriate certainty cutoff point by committing to two distinct categories. In a 
series of field experiments by Blumenschein and colleagues (1998, 2001, 2008) for a private good 
(e.g., sunglasses) and two health-related quasi-public goods (the opportunity to participate in 
asthma and diabetes management programs), respondents were first asked a dichotomous choice 
WTP contingent valuation question and then asked a follow-up certainty question divided into 
probably sure and definitely sure responses. Only yes responses from those that replied definitely 
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sure were treated as yes responses. Probably sure yes responses were treated the same as no 
responses. When recoded responses were compared to real purchases obtained in separate 
treatment groups, they found that the recoding approach removed the inflated WTP hypothetical 
bias. 
The bottom line is that these two certainty adjustment approaches have consistently been 
shown to mitigate or eliminate overstated hypothetical WTP bias. However, while the WTP 
literature on using respondent uncertainty to mitigate hypothetical bias continues to grow, the 
literature has yet to extend either technique to WTA responses. In this study we modify the 
narrative approach developed by Blumenschein and colleagues to address overstated hypothetical 
WTA responses. A modification of the recoding technique was necessary because while response 
uncertainty leads to inflated yes responses in WTP settings, response uncertainty leads to inflated 
no responses in WTA settings. That is, respondents in our study who refused the hypothetical offer 
to relinquish their fishing license (i.e., a no response) but were uncertain would likely have 
accepted if given a real—rather than a hypothetical—opportunity to respond. Therefore, in contrast 
to previous studies that treated probably sure yes responses the same as no responses in an attempt 
to remove overstated hypothetical WTP bias, we treated probably sure no responses the same as 
yes responses in an effort to eliminate overstated hypothetical WTA bias. While the modified 
recoding approach resulted in more consistent estimates of hypothetical and actual WTA in our 
study, the evidence suggests it was not effective in completely eliminating the overstated 
hypothetical bias. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the experimental 
design. Section 3 describes the sample data and Section 4 contains the empirical analysis of the 
sample data. The results are then discussed in Section 5 and the paper ends with some concluding 
comments in Section 6.   
  
2.  EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
 
Individuals who are 16 years and older and wish to recreationally fish in MA marine waters are 
required by the MA Division of Marine Fisheries (MA DMF) to obtain a recreational fishing 
license (except for disabled persons and anglers fishing on for-hire charter or party boats). The 
license costs $10 (free to those aged over 60), is not transferrable, and is valid for the entire 
calendar year in which it is purchased. Fishing licenses can be purchased on-line or from select 
retail stores in MA at any time during the year beginning in December of the previous year. In 
2012, more than 154,000 fishing licenses were issued to MA recreational saltwater anglers. 
In our 2012 survey, two separate sample groups of licensed anglers were drawn at random. 
The first comprised 700 anglers who received hypothetical cash offers in return for relinquishing 
their 2012 MA fishing license (herein referred to as the “HWTA sample group”). For the second 
sample group, we simulated an actual market for fishing licenses by offering 500 anglers cash in 
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return for relinquishing their 2012 MA fishing license (AWTA sample group). Anglers in both the 
HWTA and AWTA sample groups were informed that acceptance of the offer would mean giving 
up their license and thus their right to fish recreationally in MA marine waters for the remainder 
of 2012. 
Potential survey participants were drawn randomly each month from February through May 
2012. In each month, a random draw was conducted of 300 anglers who had obtained a license 
during the previous month and the individuals selected were subsequently assigned to one of the 
two sampling groups: 175 were assigned to the HWTA group, and 125 to the AWTA group. A 
total of 1,200 questionnaires (300 individuals per month x 4 months) were mailed to MA saltwater 
anglers who had obtained a license during the first four months of 2012. The MA saltwater 
recreational fishing season generally begins during late May-June each year, so to elicit consistent 
valuation information across licensed anglers it was important to obtain responses before the 
fishing season began. 
A modified Dillman Tailored Design (Dillman, 2007) was used to administer the survey. Four 
mailings were conducted (copies of all mailing forms associated with this article can be obtained 
from the first author). The first mailing consisted of a letter notifying each selected individual that 
they had been chosen for the survey, explained the importance of their participation, and that the 
purpose of the study was to measure the economic value of recreational fishing in MA marine 
waters to license holders like themselves. The second mailing was sent out 3-5 business days later 
and contained the survey questionnaire along with a stamped return envelope. For the AWTA 
sample group, this mailing also contained a personalized check that varied in value from $15 to 
$500. The cover letter for this mailing reiterated that the purpose of the study was to determine the 
monetary value anglers like themselves place on being able to go saltwater recreational fishing in 
MA waters. The third mailing was a postcard that thanked anglers who had already responded, and 
served as a reminder to those who had not yet responded to complete and return their 
questionnaires. The postcards were mailed five business days after the second mailing. The fourth 
mailing was sent to anglers who had not responded within three weeks of the third mailing. This 
final mailing included a replacement questionnaire and explained the importance of responding to 
the survey as the data collection aspect of the survey would soon be terminating. As well as the 
valuation questions, the surveys inquired about the number of days fished in 2011, the expected 
number of days fished in 2012, boat ownership, and demographics. 
The first sample group (HWTA) received hypothetical cash offers in return for relinquishing 
their 2012 fishing license. These offers ranged randomly in log-linear amounts from $15 to $500, 
and the dichotomous choice question was worded as follows: 
 
“Imagine that a check payable to you for $[ ] was included along with this survey as a cash offer 
for your 2012 Massachusetts Recreational Saltwater Fishing Permit.2 Knowing that the fishing 
permit is required for anyone that fishes recreationally in Massachusetts marine waters during 2012, 
would you be willing to send us your permit, and in doing so, give up your right to fish 
recreationally in Massachusetts marine waters for the rest of this year in return for $[ ]?”  
 
2 In this study the words “permit” and “license” are interchangeable.   
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Short cheap-talk script was provided before the respondent indicated yes or no that encouraged 
anglers to try and answer the hypothetical question as if it were an actual cash offer.   
 
“Although the question is hypothetical, please consider the offer carefully and try to answer the 
question as if this was an actual cash offer to you for your 2012 Massachusetts Recreational 
Saltwater Fishing Permit, and then check the indicated box below.  [ ] Yes  [ ] No” 
Following their yes or no response, a certainty question asked the respondents to indicate if they 
were probably sure or definitely sure that they would [or would not, if answered no] give up their 
right to saltwater fish in MA waters during 2012 in return for $[ ]?   
 
Individuals in the AWTA sample received actual cash offers (in the form of a personalized 
check), in amounts varying between $15 and $500 to relinquish their 2012 license. The offer letter 
described the importance of the study, explained how the angler was selected for participation, and 
provided the following instructions: 
 
“The enclosed check in the amount of $____ is yours to cash if you fill out and return the enclosed one-
page questionnaire and your 2012 Massachusetts saltwater fishing permit to us in the return envelope 
provided. If you accept our offer by cashing your check and mailing us the questionnaire and your 2012 
fishing permit, your permit will be invalidated by the Massachusetts Division of Marine Fisheries. You 
will then be unable to obtain another one for the remainder of 2012. This means that you will be giving 
up your right to fish recreationally in Massachusetts marine waters for the rest of this year in return for 
$[ ].”   
 
“If you decide to decline our cash offer and keep your 2012 Massachusetts saltwater fishing permit 
(so that you can fish in Massachusetts marine waters during the rest of 2012), we ask that you 
please complete and return the one-page questionnaire along with the check. Please consider this 
offer carefully. Your check will expire on _______ so we look forward to hearing from you soon.” 
 
The personalized checks expired six weeks from the mail date and, given the simulated 
marketplace developed for this sample group no cheap-talk or certainty questions were included 
on the questionnaire.   
3.  SAMPLE DATA 
3.1 Response Rates by Treatment Group 
A total of 465 questionnaires were returned from the HWTA group (66% of 700 potential 
respondents). Of these, 11 were excluded from the analysis; nine were removed because the 
HWTA question was not answered and two were excluded due to a possible publicity bias. Shortly 
after the first monthly wave of questionnaires was mailed, a story about the study was published 
in the Boston Globe newspaper on 2 March 2012. Within a week, six other newspapers in MA 
printed their own stories about the study. This created the possibility that readers of the stories, 
who had no intention of going saltwater recreational fishing in 2012, would purchase a $10 license 
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hoping to be mailed one of the future surveys that contained a $500 check (i.e., pay $10 for the 
chance to win $500). To minimize this possible publicity bias, we excluded two questionnaires 
received after March 2 from respondents who indicated they did not fish in 2011 and did not expect 
to fish in 2012. We felt that these two respondents were the ones most likely influenced by the 
newspaper stories.3 Table 2 shows the response rates by treatment group and offer amount, after 
removing invalid responses. 
 
Table 2. Response Rates by Offer Amount and Treatment 
 Useable/Mailed Surveys (Response Rate) 
Offer Amount ($’s) HWTA AWTA 
15 57/89     (.64) 39/64     (.61) 
25 55/80     (.69) 30/59     (.51) 
40 45/69     (.65) 26/52     (.50) 
55 36/56     (.64) 22/40     (.55) 
75 34/49     (.69) 21/34     (.62) 
100 34/49     (.69) 18/34     (.53) 
125 28/49     (.57) 24/33     (.73) 
160 29/42     (.69) 14/30     (.47) 
200 30/42     (.71) 15/29     (.52) 
250 20/35     (.57) 13/24     (.54) 
300 21/28     (.75) 13/21     (.62) 
350 15/28     (.54) 13/20     (.65) 
400 19/28     (.68) 12/20     (.60) 
450 12/28     (.43) 11/20     (.55) 
500 19/28     (.68) 13/20     (.65) 
All 454/700 (.65) 284/500 (.57) 
   
Of the 301 license holders who completed the AWTA questionnaire (60% of 500 potential 
respondents), 284 either accepted or rejected the offer by returning their check or their license. 
Seventeen of the 301 respondents were excluded from subsequent analysis; 12 were removed 
because they kept their license and cashed their check, one was eliminated because the offer was 
accepted on the questionnaire and the license returned, but the check was never cashed, and four 
others were excluded because of the possible publicity bias. 
The success of the simulated AWTA market depended on the effectiveness of excluding 
anglers from access if they accepted the real offer. All AWTA anglers were clearly informed that 
they would be giving up their right to fish in MA waters if their offer checks were cashed. As only 
12 AWTA anglers (4% of the 301 AWTA respondents) did not play by the rules, the language in 
the questionnaire seemed sufficient in overcoming this potential obstacle. Nonetheless, we do not 
know if any of the anglers who accepted their AWTA offers decided to fish during 2012 without 
a valid permit. Based on comments received from some survey participants, it was obvious that 
 
3 If our data cleaning approach was not sufficient at removing publicity-influenced responses, our estimates of 
WTA could be underestimated. As all of the 15 offer amounts exceeded the cost of the fishing license, any publicity-
influenced angler that participated in our study would likely have accepted their real or hypothetical offer. Inclusion 
of these responses would have raised the acceptance rates leading to underestimates of WTA. On the other hand, the 
publicity generated from the newspaper stories may have actually had a positive effect on response rates by alleviating 
erroneous beliefs about the purpose of the study and concerns that the checks were illegitimate.   
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the monetary offers were considered very seriously. Hence, we believe that accepting the cash 
offer and then fishing without a permit was minimal or non-existent. In addition, the MA DMF 
made numerous announcements indicating increased enforcement of the permit requirement 
during the 2012 fishing season (Paul Diodati, Director MA DMF, in discussion with first author, 
March 2012). 
All 199 of the AWTA non-respondents (i.e., those who did not return the questionnaire) were 
also eliminated from the analysis. Survey recipients in our study may have thrown the envelope 
away without opening it, may not have received the questionnaire in time to respond for some 
reason (e.g., mailed to a vacation house address), doubted the validity of the study and ignored it, 
or simply never took the time to fill out the questionnaire. If our budget would have been larger, 
we would have attempted to contact non-respondents to determine the reason for their non-
response. We considered treating AWTA non-responders the same as a no response (i.e., refused 
their offer), by making the assumption that all non-responders actually received and read the 
questionnaire, but chose not to return it because the cash offer was deemed too low. If this were 
true we would expect the response rates to be related to the offer amounts and increase as the offer 
amounts increased. A comparison of the AWTA response rates across the 15 offer levels shows 
no discernable increase (Table 2). We tested this empirically in a logistic regression by regressing 
response (modeled as 1 if responded to the AWTA questionnaire and 0 if did not respond) on the 
15 offer amounts. The regression results indicated that the likelihood of response was not 
significantly correlated to the offer amount (χ2 = 1.79; p = 0.1286). Therefore, since response was 
not related in a statistically significant manner to the offer amount, there was no strong basis for 
treating the AWTA non-responders as if they legitimately refused their offer. 
 
3.2 Respondent Characteristics by Treatment Group 
Table 3 summarizes the personal characteristics of the survey respondents. The variables presented 
in this table are those that are included in the regression analysis that will be reported shortly. No 
statistically significant differences (p<0.05) were detected between the sample groups using 
two-sided t-tests for continuous variables and the Rao-Scott design corrected chi-square test for 
categorical variables4, with the exception of household income which was higher in the AWTA 
group (χ2 = 17.12; p = 0.0166). We control for differences in personal characteristics in the logistic 
regression models we subsequently develop to examine whether the probability of acceptance 
differs between the HWTA and AWTA groups. 
 
Table 3. Personal Characteristics by Treatment Group 
 HWTA AWTA 
Own a boat (%) 35.37 31.05 
Expected number of days will fish in 2012 29.26 26.26 
Age (years) 55.12 55.67 
 
4 The Rao-Scott chi-square test is computed from the Pearson chi-square statistic and a design correction is applied 
to account for the stratified random sampling design of our survey data. See Rao and Scott (1981) for details about 
the design-adjusted chi-square test.         
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Annual household income composition ($1,000)   
< 15 (%) 6.32 1.95 
15 - 34,999 (%) 12.40 16.24 
35 - 49,999 (%) 15.54 13.08 
50 - 74,999 (%) 25.15 16.21 
75 - 99,999 (%) 13.09 12.40 
100 - 149,999 (%) 18.43 24.73 
150 – 199,999 (%)  6.18 9.16 
> 200,000 (%) 2.90 6.22 
Number of people in household 2.70 2.81 
Employed fulltime (%) 48.40 53.32 
Education composition   
Some high school (%) 6.16 10.09 
High school (%) 29.19 22.54 
Some college (%) 17.50 16.01 
      Two-year college degree of technical school (%) 10.32 12.32 
      Four-year college degree (%) 17.58 19.03 
      Some graduate work but not a graduate degree (%) 5.82 6.03 
      Graduate degree 13.44 13.99 
      Married (%) 75.14 74.12 
 
 
4.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
Table 4 shows the weighted acceptance rates by dollar amount for the two sample groups.5  As 
expected, the proportion accepting the hypothetical and actual cash offers is generally higher at 
the higher dollar amounts. The acceptance rates in both groups are thus consistent with downward 
sloping demand curves. However, a comparison of the acceptance rate distributions reveals that 
the AWTA acceptance rates are higher at all offer amounts above $55. These differences are 
statistically significant at the 5% level for the $300, $350, and $450 offer amounts and at the 10% 
level for the $75 offer amount. Overall, the acceptance rate for the AWTA group is almost twice 
that for the HWTA group (39% versus 23%), and the difference is statistically significant (p<0.05).  
This result suggests that anglers are more likely to relinquish their permits for actual rather than 
hypothetical dollars. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Table 4. Weighted Acceptance Rates by Offer Amount 
   Probably Sure No Responses 
   Recoded as Yes Responses 
 AWTA HWTA  HWTA 
Offer Amount ($’s) Proportion Accepting  Proportion Accepting 
15 .08  .01b  .01b 
25    0 .10  .12 
 
5 Estimation of population parameters from samples drawn from a stratified random design must be weighted 
according to strata characteristics and related survey procedures (Cochran, 1977). As the sampling rates in our study 
varied by month, treatment group, and offer levels, weights were calculated that reflect both the sample and 
experimental designs of the study. The full weighting procedures are detailed in the Appendix.  
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40 .08 .10  .16 
55 .13 .26  .30 
75 .32 .10b  .13 
100 .30 .16  .26 
125 .41 .25  .38 
160 .41 .18  .24 
200 .55 .31  .39 
250 .34 .21  .28 
300 .63 .24a  .36 
350 .83 .21a  .37a 
400 .52 .39  .45 
450 .67 .38a  .48 
500 .67 .62  .65 
All .39 .23a  .32b 
a Probability value of the difference compared to AWTA was rejected at the 5% 
 level using the Rao-Scott design corrected chi-square test. 
b Probability value of the difference compared to AWTA was rejected at the 10% 
 level using the Rao-Scott design corrected chi-square test. 
 
Applying the modified certainty adjustment technique outlined earlier, we converted 35 
probably sure HWTA no responses to yes responses. This reduced the differences in acceptance 
rates between the HWTA and AWTA groups (Table 4), but the AWTA acceptance rates remained 
higher than the HWTA rates at all offer amounts above $55 and the overall acceptance rates were 
still statistically different when the criterion was the 10% level of significance.6 
While the weighted acceptance rates by dollar amount are informative, they do not take account 
of potential differences in personal characteristics among the two groups (shown in Table 3). We 
control for these differences by combining the responses of both sample groups in pooled logistic 
regression models (using household income and the other personal characteristics as covariates in 
the models), and constructing a hypothetical dummy variable that has the value of 1 if the angler 
is in the HWTA group and 0 if the angler is in the AWTA group. 
 
 
 The basic relationship specified in a dichotomous choice logit model is: 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌𝑒𝑠) = 1 − {1 + exp[𝛽0 − 𝛽1($𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝑍1)+. . . 𝛽𝑛(𝑍𝑛)]}
−1 [1] 
 
where the probability of a yes response (i.e., acceptance) is related to the dichotomous choice cash 
offer amount ($Amount) and also to the personal characteristic variables (Z) assumed to affect 
 
6 Per a reviewer’s recommendation, we also calculated Turnbull-based lower bound estimates of WTA from the 
weighted acceptance rates shown in Table 4. Refer to Haab and McConnell (2002) for calculating Turnbull lower 
bound non-parametric point estimates in a multi-price setting. This approach yielded lower bound estimates of WTA 
for the unadjusted HWTA sample ($213.68) and the recoded HWTA sample ($188.35) that were both higher and 
significantly different from the AWTA sample ($138.34) at the 5% level. These findings align with the acceptance 
rate comparisons and indicate that the hypothetical recoding approach mitigated, but did not completely eliminate the 
hypothetical bias. 
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utility (Hanemann 1984). From Eq. [1] Hanemann (1989) provides a formula for a non-negative 
mean WTA: 
 
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑊𝑇𝐴 = (1 𝛽1⁄ ) ∗ (ln (1 + exp (− (𝛽0 + ∑(𝛽𝑛(𝑍𝑛))))))  [2] 
  
where βn is the vector of coefficients and Zn are the sample means of the associated independent 
variables. Confidence intervals around mean WTA were then calculated by the Krinsky-Robb 
method using 50 thousand draws (Krinsky and Robb, 1986). 
 
4.1 Regression Models   
The results of the WTA logistic regression models, estimated using maximum likelihood 
techniques, are shown in Table 5. Two WTA logistic regression equations were developed. The 
first equation considered all no responses to be no responses in the HWTA group. The second 
equation recoded all probably sure no responses to yes responses in the HWTA group. 
The number of observations used in the regression models are lower than given in Table 2, due 
primarily to missing household income values. Imputation procedures were considered to replace 
the missing income data, but we decided that this was unnecessary because similar regressions that 
excluded the household income variable gave virtually identical values for the other coefficients. 
In addition, statistical comparisons of the remaining covariates in the models for those that 
answered the household income question and those that did not showed no differences at the 5% 
level. We also tested a logarithmic functional form that yielded similar results to our logistic 
equations, as did specification of a probit model.
12
Journal of Ocean and Coastal Economics, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 7
https://cbe.miis.edu/joce/vol6/iss1/7
DOI: 10.15351/2373-8456.1111
Table 5. WTA Logistic Regression Analysis 
  
 
Pooled AWTA and HWTA 
 Pooled AWTA and HWTA with HWTA 
Probably Sure No Responses Recoded as 
Yes Responses   
 Coefficient SE Marginal Effect  Coefficient SE Marginal Effect 
Intercept 2.221* 0.947   1.826 0.870  
Hypothetical dummya -1.157* 0.277 -0.206  -0.517* 0.247 -0.109 
$Amountb 0.006* 0.001 0.001  0.005* 0.001 0.001 
Boat ownershipc  -1.134* 0.305 -0.202  -0.729* 0.265 -0.154 
Expected days will fish in 2012d -0.032* 0.007 -0.006  -0.030* 0.007 -0.006 
Annual household gross incomee -0.225* 0.099 -0.040  -0.193* 0.091 -0.041 
Number of people in householdf -0.133 0.115 -0.024  -0.069 0.103 -0.015 
Employed fulltimeg -0.698* 0.286 -0.124  -0.622* 0.276 -0.131 
Education Levelh 0.022 0.073 0.004  0.021 0.068 0.004 
Agei -0.022 0.012 -0.004  -0.016 0.011 -0.003 
Marriedj 0.113 0.376 0.020  -0.224 0.341 -0.047 
        
Number of obs. 626    626   
Wald chi-square (p-value) 73.421 (0.000)   79.576 (0.000)  
Log-likelihood -266.865    -305.161   
McFadden pseudo R2 0.268    0.217   
% correct prediction 80.4    77.4   
        
WTA values ($’s)        
Mean AWTA (95% confidence limits) 338 (279 – 396)     
Mean HWTA (95% confidence limits) 520 (437 – 604)  436 (362 – 510) 
* Significance at the 5% level or lower. 
a Hypothetical dummy (categorical variable): 1, if HWTA group, 0, if AWTA group. 
b $Amount (categorical variable): 15 cash offer levels between $15 and $500. 
c Boat ownership (categorical variable): 1, if owned a boat, 0, if did not own a boat. 
d Expected days will fish in 2012 denotes anticipated fishing days during the year.   
e Annual household gross income (categorical variable): 1=less than $15,000; 2=$15,000-$34,999; 3=$35,000-$49,999; 4=$50,000-$74,999; 5=$75,000-$99,999; 6=$100,000-
$149,999; 7=$150,000-$199,000; 8=$200,000 or over. 
f Number of people in household denotes number of people living in the household. 
g Employed fulltime (categorical variable): 1, if employed fulltime, 0, if not employed fulltime. 
h Education level (categorical variable): 1=some high school; 2=high school; 3=some college; 4=two-year college degree; 5=four-year college degree; 6=some graduate work but 
not a graduate degree; 7=graduate degree. 
i Age denotes actual age in years. 
j Married (categorical variable): 1, if married, 0, if not married. 
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In the first regression model, the hypothetical group dummy variable is negative, statistically 
significant (p<0.05), and has a marginal effect of 20.6 percentage points. This means that the 
probability of accepting the amount offered in the hypothetical treatment is on average 20.6 
percentage points lower than in the actual treatment. If we consider the responses from the AWTA 
group as a benchmark for assessing hypothetical bias, these results align with the non-parametric 
comparisons of acceptance rates discussed earlier (Table 4) and imply a strong downward bias in 
the probability of acceptance for the HWTA group. In the second regression model, where all 
probably sure no responses were considered to be yes responses, the hypothetical group dummy 
coefficient is closer to zero but still statistically significant. Additionally, the marginal effect is 
reduced but is still almost 11 percentage points. Hence, adjusting the HWTA responses based on 
the follow-up certainty question reduced the hypothetical bias, but did not eliminate it.  
We can also see that the coefficients on the offer amount ($Amount) and on several of the 
personal characteristic variables (i.e., boat ownership, expected days will fish in 2012, annual 
household gross income, and employed fulltime) are statistically significant in both regression 
equations. The signs for the offer and background variables are all consistent with prior 
expectations. Higher offer amounts are positively related to the probability of a yes response, boat 
ownership lessens the probability that an angler will accept an offer and sell his/her permit, the 
more days an angler expected to fish in 2012 reduces the probability of acceptance, and anglers 
with higher annual household gross incomes or are employed fulltime are less likely to accept an 
offer. None of the remaining personal characteristic control variables included in the models are 
statistically significant. 
In our final (and perhaps most important) comparison of the responses from the AWTA and 
HWTA groups, we compared the parametric estimates of mean WTA values. As indicated in Table 
3, the actual mean value of a 2012 MA saltwater recreational fishing permit is $338 and the 
hypothetical mean value is $520. The difference of $182 is statistically different from zero at the 
5% level because the confidence intervals do not overlap. When all probably sure no responses 
are recoded as yes responses in the HWTA group, the hypothetical mean value declines to $436. 
Although this value is closer to the actual mean value and the confidence intervals overlap in the 
tails, the 95% confidence interval for the difference between the two group means is 3.67 – 192.61. 
Because this interval does not contain zero, we rejected the null hypothesis that the group means 
are the same (Poe, Severance-Lossin, and Welsh 1994). Consistent with the preceding evaluations 
that found statistically significant differences between the hypothetical and actual responses, these 
findings indicate a strong upward bias in the hypothetical mean WTA value, even after adjusting 
the hypothetical responses based on a follow-up certainty question.7   
 
 
7 As further evidence, we compared the combined AWTA and HWTA models with models estimated separately 
for each of the two groups. Likelihood ratios and mean WTA values were compared and gave results consistently 
similar to those from the models in Table 3. Given these similarities, we decided to use the combined estimates.        
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5.  DISCUSSION 
 
Our study evaluated whether differences exist between hypothetical and actual dichotomous WTA 
responses for a quasi-public good – a MA saltwater recreational fishing license. We compared 
stated preference dichotomous choice WTA responses with those obtained in an actual market. 
Our parametric and non-parametric evaluations align with the notably limited previous evidence 
that suggested hypothetical measures of WTA generally overstate values based on actual 
transactions. In addition, criterion validity tests revealed that the mean hypothetical WTA value 
for a 2012 MA saltwater recreational fishing license ($520) was 1.54 times higher than the value 
derived from actual transactions ($338), and this difference was statistically significant. The mean 
of the nine hypothetical/actual WTA ratios shown in Table 1 is 7.17. However, two of the WTA 
observations in Table 1 were from one study (Brookshire and Coursey 1987) and are over nine 
times higher than the next highest reported observation. If those observations are removed, the 
mean of the remaining ratios is 1.51 – nearly identical to our result. 
We also evaluated the effectiveness of applying a very practical ex-post certainty adjustment 
technique to remove the overstated WTA hypothetical bias. While prior evidence on the use of the 
adjustment technique in WTP environments has shown that it can be effective at eliminating the 
difference between actual and hypothetical mean WTP, the approach had never been extended to 
WTA responses. We find that when applied in our WTA setting, the approach mitigated but did 
not eliminate the overstated hypothetical bias. The hypothetical mean WTA value declined to $436 
after applying the adjustment approach, but this value was still about 1.3 times higher than the 
mean value based on actual responses and the difference was statistically significant. 
Further applications of the ex-post certainty adjustment technique we employed are needed 
before larger conclusions can be drawn regarding the link between uncertainty and WTA 
hypothetical bias. A potential issue with our split-sample comparisons is that they do not establish 
a definitive link between the degree of certainty in hypothetical responses and actual responses. 
That is, by treating probably sure no responses the same as yes responses we increased the 
incidence of yes answers. In turn, this had the obvious effect of mitigating the hypothetical bias 
and by coincidence the proportion of adjusted yes responses could have risen high enough that 
they equaled the proportion of actual yes responses. Our results show otherwise, but this issue 
could be further evaluated through within-sample comparisons of the same individuals who are 
first asked a hypothetical WTA valuation question followed by a certainty question, and then 
confronted with an actual sell decision. Experiments of this kind have been conducted in WTP 
settings where hypothetical WTP responses were found to overstate values based on actual 
purchases (Blumenschein et al. 1998; Johannesson, Liljas, and Johansson 1998). The degree of 
certainty in hypothetical WTP responses was found to be a strong predictor of actual purchasing 
behavior. Within-sample comparisons of both hypothetical and actual WTA certainty responses 
would be valuable for assessing the validity of the certainty approach used in our study. 
While we cannot definitely explain why the certainty adjustment approach failed to remove 
the WTA hypothetical bias in our study, we theorize that it was related to: (a) a considerably high 
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degree of unfamiliarity associated with valuing recreational fishing licenses; (b) protest behavior; 
and (c) the non-incentive compatible survey design. 
Given that the nominal fee ($10) required to purchase an annual MA saltwater fishing permit 
is determined by the MA state legislature and not through market forces, most anglers probably 
had never realistically thought about the value of their fishing permit. Unlike normal private goods 
that people may repeatedly buy and sell in a market, respondents to our survey could not 
adequately draw upon previous experiences to guide their acceptance/rejection decision. Saltwater 
recreational fishing is an inherently unique activity with no perfect substitutes so it is unlikely that 
many of the respondents had well-defined monetary preferences for their fishing permit. We 
believe this unfamiliarity was at least partially responsible for the disparities between hypothetical 
and actual responses. Although the AWTA treatment group was subject to the same unfamiliarity, 
respondents in the HWTA group had less incentive to really reflect on the matter as no actual 
money was involved. This hypothesis dates back to at least Freeman (1979) and Bishop, Heberlein, 
and Kealy (1983). For the HWTA group, we believe that the lack of familiarity combined with the 
hypothetical nature of the survey caused some anglers to seek conservatively high requirements 
for compensation. That is, some anglers may have recognized that they would be willing to accept 
even lower amounts, but because they did not thoroughly explore their preferences, due to the 
artificiality of the survey, they rejected the offer to be on the safe side.8 
Our certainty adjustment results lend credence to this hypothesis. The magnitude of the 
hypothetical bias declined after treating HWTA probably sure no responses the same as yes 
responses. Nevertheless, while the certainty adjustment technique reduced the hypothetical bias, it 
did not eliminate it. We suspect that even some of the HWTA definitely sure no respondents would 
also have accepted compensation if given a real—rather than a hypothetical—opportunity to 
respond. If so, this may explain, at least in part, why our certainty adjustment approach failed to 
eliminate the bias. 
Another possible cause, first suggested by Hammack and Brown (1974), is that when 
participants are offered hypothetical compensation for goods which evoke strong moral sentiments 
or have high intrinsic value, some participants may respond with indignation by rejecting the offer 
without considering their actual monetary preferences or seek absurdly high compensation 
requirements.9 Saltwater recreational fishing in Massachusetts is considered an inalienable right 
by some anglers, as proclaimed in the newspaper stories written about the study, so this type of 
“protest” behavior cannot be ruled out. Protest responses may have occurred in both the HWTA 
and AWTA markets because the only difference between the two markets was the exchange of 
hypothetical versus real dollars. The AWTA market involved actual money though, and a real 
market provides more powerful incentives to explore monetary preferences than a hypothetical 
market. Therefore, we believe that fewer AWTA participants ultimately interpreted their response 
 
8 This unfamiliarity hypothesis did not translate into longer questionnaire return rates for the hypothetical groups 
though. There were no statistical differences in the questionnaire return times among the two sample groups.  
9 In addition to Hammack and Brown (1974), further elaboration of this moral statement hypothesis is provided 
in Kahneman and Knetsch (1992), Kahneman, Ritov, and Schkade (1999), Svedsäter (2003), and Bischoff (2008).  
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as a moral statement.10 If so, this would also have contributed to the failure of the certainty 
adjustment approach to remove the overstated hypothetical bias in our study. 
The last possible reason we propose is associated with the non-binding format of the 
hypothetical dichotomous choice mechanism. In the more recent literature, consequentiality and 
incentive compatibility are increasingly being recognized as perhaps the most essential conditions 
for truthful reporting in stated preference surveys (Carson and Groves 2007; Kling, Phaneuf, and 
Zhao 2012; Kim, Kling, and Zhao 2015). Carson and Groves (2007) argue that the necessary 
conditions for truthful reporting require (1) that the respondent believes that the study results may 
influence something that the respondent cares about (i.e., consequentiality), and (2) having an 
incentive compatible elicitation mechanism that discourages strategic responses. To our 
knowledge these conditions have never been extended to a WTA environment, but there is no 
reason to believe that the same theoretical protocols are not applicable. 
We speculate that our dichotomous choice WTA design was perceived as consequential mainly 
because recipients were notified that they were selected from a small sample of MA saltwater 
license holders for participation in an important government sponsored study commissioned to 
measure the monetary value that anglers place on being able to go saltwater recreational fishing in 
MA – an activity all license holders must care about to varying degrees. However, the HWTA 
elicitation mechanism did not have the same incentive compatibility properties as the AWTA 
mechanism because anglers were able to keep their license even if they accepted the hypothetical 
offers (whereas AWTA anglers were required to relinquish their license to accept an actual cash 
offer). In an attempt to provide equivalent incentives and discourage strategic behavior by the 
hypothetical recipients, cheap talk script was added that asked anglers to consider the hypothetical 
question carefully and to respond as if an actual cash offer had been tendered. While the evidence 
indicates that cheap talk varies in its effectiveness (Morrison and Brown 2009), the addition of this 
script in our study may not have been sufficient to discourage some HWTA recipients from 
responding strategically. 
The obvious implication of the non-binding hypothetical format was that it provided strategic 
incentives for rejecting hypothetical offers that would otherwise have been acceptable if the 
compensation was real. This is the optimal strategy for anglers that inferred a response of this type 
would inflate the “true” value of their fishing licenses in our study and ultimately raise the study’s 
estimate of the economic value of saltwater recreational fishing in MA. Anglers responding in this 
manner would naturally have indicated that they were definitely sure that they would not give up 
their right to saltwater fish in MA waters during 2012 in return for the hypothetical offer. As 
definitely sure responses were taken at “face-value,” this type of strategic misrepresentation may 
also have led to the failure of the certainty adjustment approach to remove the overstated 
hypothetical bias in our study. In hindsight, we may have been able to better assess the extent of 
potential strategic responses by including a follow-up question that asked respondents to state their 
 
10 In all likelihood, the majority of AWTA “protest” responses were excluded from the study. The logical reaction 
for the AWTA anglers affected by this “moral statement” issue would be to simply refuse to participate in the survey. 
As previously mentioned, all non-respondents were dropped from the analysis.  
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reasons for accepting [rejecting] the offer amount. Debriefing questions that explore the nature of 
respondents’ decision-making process have proved to be informative for identifying strategic 
behavior from stated preference WTP dichotomous choice responses (see Vossler, Doyon, and 
Rondeau 2012; Moore et al. 2018).        
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
   
The results from this research provide the first evidence about the effectiveness of an ex-post 
certainty adjustment technique in a WTA environment. It would, of course, be unwarranted to 
draw overarching conclusions about the effectiveness of the certainty adjustment approach we 
used based on a single WTA experiment, but our findings are worthy of additional exploration. 
The issue to be resolved is whether our WTA result – that the approach mitigated but did not 
eliminate the overstated hypothetical bias – is generalizable across alternative goods and 
experimental designs. 
As noted earlier, stricter access restrictions would deprive saltwater anglers of their de jure 
rights to fishery resources.  In such cases, if WTP measures of losses are estimated instead of WTA 
estimates, the real value of the associated losses will likely be underestimated. To stimulate 
development of more defensible WTA-based measures of losses for environmental goods and 
services, there is a need for additional studies that compare hypothetical and actual WTA 
valuations. This gap in the literature also limits the ability of researchers to explain disparities 
between hypothetical and actual stated WTA values across studies. While meta-analysis of 
hypothetical bias has been conducted previously (List and Gallet 2001; Little and Berrens 2004; 
Little, Broadbent, and Berrens 2012; Penn and Hu 2018), the lack of WTA studies contained in 
these meta-analyses (about 5% of the total) make it truly difficult to capture the influence of WTA 
on hypothetical bias. In fact, Murphy et al. (2005) exclude WTA observations in their meta-
analysis of stated preference studies due to concerns of insufficient WTA observations. We hope 
that this issue can be resolved through additional comparison studies of hypothetical and actual 
WTA valuation responses. 
Depending upon the context of the stated preference application though, eliciting values in a 
non-hypothetical manner may be cost prohibitive or politically infeasible. Indeed, we faced 
considerable challenges obtaining funding for our study due to the added cost of the real simulated 
marketplace and the questions it raised about government agencies ultimately paying anglers not 
to fish. A purely hypothetical WTA study would not have raised the same level of consternation. 
To overcome these obstacles it may be possible to conduct controlled experiments for a surrogate 
good that could be used to measure and adjust for the hypothetical bias at hand (Harrison 2006). 
In cases such as ours, however, where there are no close substitutes for saltwater recreational 
fishing licenses, there may be no other practical way than to address the issue head on. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Final analysis weights were calculated to reflect both the sample and experimental designs of the 
study. A stratified random without replacement design was used to select the sample with strata 
defined by the four 1-month waves (January-April, 2012). Base sample weights were calculated 








where 𝑤𝑖,𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 was the base sample weight for unit 𝑖 in stratum ℎ, 𝜋ℎ𝑖
−1 was the inverse of the 
inclusion probability for unit 𝑖, 𝑁ℎ was the total count of sample units in the frame for stratum ℎ, 
and 𝑛ℎ was the sample size or number of units originally drawn from stratum ℎ using simple 
random sampling without replacement. 
 To account for nonresponse, nonresponding units were assumed to be missing completely 
at random within strata and a poststratification adjustment method (e.g., Lessler and Kalsbeek 
1992, p. 183) was employed to adjust the weights of responding units to represent the entire drawn 
sample: 
 






  if 𝑖 is a respondent 

























where 𝑤𝑖,𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝 was the nonresponse adjusted sample weight for unit 𝑖 in stratum ℎ, 𝛼ℎ was the 
poststratification adjustment made to the base weight for all responding units in ℎ, and 𝑛𝑟 was the 
number of responding units in ℎ. Applying this adjustment increased the sample weights of the 
responding units such that the sum of the adjusted sample weights for the responding units, 𝑛𝑟, 
equaled the sum of the base weights for the full sample, 𝑛ℎ. The respondents now represented both 
themselves and the nonrespondents. 
 A second poststratification adjustment was made to account for the experimental design. 
Sample units were randomly assigned to one of 30 distinct treatments: two valuation groups 
(HWTA and AWTA) crossed with fifteen different monetary offer levels (15, 25, 40, 55, 75, 100, 
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where 𝑤𝑖,𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 was the final analysis weight for unit 𝑖 in treatment group 𝑡, 𝛼𝑡
′  was the 
poststratification adjustment made to the nonresponse weight for all responding units in 𝑡, 𝑛𝑟1 was 
the number of responding units in treatment group 1 (HWTA, 15), and 𝑛𝑟𝑡 was the number of 
responding units in treatment group 𝑡. For this adjustment, the sums of the nonresponse weights 
for each treatment group were standardized to the sum of the nonresponse weights for the first 
treatment group (HWTA, 15). Using the first treatment group as the control total was made for 
convenience and did not have any impact on study results. Giving equal total weight to both 
treatment groups ensured results would not be biased towards the treatment with larger totals of 
nonresponse weights, a situation that could occur due to differential nonresponse or initial random 
assignments among the two treatments.   
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